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While the IASB has eliminated virtually all the differences between US GAAP and IFRS with 
respect to segment reporting, the quality of segment disclosure after IFRS 8 remains 
questionable, with the European Parliament only endorsing IFRS 8 after a great deal of scrutiny 
and much debate. We investigate the impact of segment information quality and quantity on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts after the adoption of IFRS 8.We further address how country-level 
enforcement influences this relationship using a sample from EU countries. The findings reveal 
that the quality and quantity of segment information are associated with more accurate earnings 
forecasts following IFRS 8. Furthermore, the results suggest that enforcement plays a pivotal 
role in shaping the impact of the principles-based IFRS 8. These findings contribute to the 
ongoing debate on the quality of segment information under the management approach and role 
of accounting regulation enforcement. They also provide early evidence on the usefulness of 















Introduction   
This study examines the impact of changes in segment information quality on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts after the adoption of IFRS 8 based on a sample of large firms in the European 
Union (EU). In 2006, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRS 8 
“Operating Segments” to replace IAS 14 Revised “Segment Reporting” as part of the IASB-
FASB convergence project (IFRS 8, para.2). While IAS 14R was based on the management 
approach modified for risk and rewards, IFRS 8 adopted the full management approach, which 
requires that operating segments be identified based on those internal reports that are regularly 
reviewed by the Chief Operating Decision Maker (CODM).  
The full management approach was first introduced in 1997 in the US SFAS 131, 
“Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information”. Following this, the 
literature addressed various issues such as the information disclosed, reporting disincentives 
(i.e., agency and proprietary costs), and the economic consequences of disclosure (Botosan & 
Stanford, 2005; Ettredge, 2002; Herrmann & Thomas, 2000a; Hope & Thomas, 2008; Hope, 
Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2009; Nichols, Street, & Gray, 2000; Wang et al., 2011). However, 
few studies have examined these issues in the context of the EU (Crawford et al., 2012; 
Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 2012; Leung & Verriest, 2015; André, Filip, & Moldovan, 2016). 
Furthermore, the findings regarding the impact of the management approach on analysts' 
earnings forecast errors of US firms are inconclusive to date (Berger & Hann, 2003; Botosan & 
Stanford, 2005; Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2006).  
The IASB post-implementation review documents that an investigation of the 
consequences of IFRS 8 would help resolve uncertainties about the adequacy of disclosures 
(IASB, 2013; Nichols, Street, & Tarca, 2013). Therefore, we examine how the anticipated 
increase in geographical fineness and decrease in the number of items disclosed under IFRS 8 
affects analysts' earnings forecast errors. In so doing, we extend the ongoing debate on the 
quality of segment information under the management approach by providing evidence on how 
it enhances users’ decision-making effectiveness. Specifically, we provide evidence on the 




clarify which attributes of segment information help them to produce more accurate earnings 
forecasts. Our findings are important given the inconsistent findings in the existing literature 
regarding the impact of the management approach on analysts' earnings forecast errors. Our 
paper also provides timely evidence on the usefulness of country-by-country reporting, an 
important issue given the various legislative proposals to mandate country-by-country reporting 
in the EU and the US (KPMG 2014; OECD 2015).   
Although one of the anticipated benefits of common accounting standards in the EU is 
the reduction of country differences and the consequent improvement in comparability, 
variations in disclosure practices may remain (Armstrong et al., 2010; Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 
2000; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Daske et al., 2008; Holthausen, 2009). While the European 
Securities and Market Authority works to ensure uniform and timely implementation of 
regulations such as IFRS in member states, the wide diversity of enforcement systems across 
EU countries in terms of design, procedures and outcomes (Berger, 2010) can impede this goal. 
Therefore, evidence on the role of institutional settings and in particular enforcement, is needed 
to fully understand financial reporting outcomes (Holthausen, 2009). 
While several studies examined the role of institutional settings, much of this literature 
focussed on institutional factors as drivers of IFRS outcomes in general (Li, 2010; Byard, Li, & 
Yu, 2011; Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Christensen, Hail & Leuz, 2013; Houqe, Easton & van 
Zijl 2014). Our study instead examines how country-level enforcement systems shape firm-
level changes in disclosure and assesses the impact of these changes under a specific standard 
(IFRS 8). IFRS 8 provides more guidelines on geographical fineness disclosures than its 
predecessor standard, mandating the disclosure of revenues and assets by country of domicile 
and for each individual country with significant revenues and/or assets. In contrast, it mandates 
less items of disclosure, mandating only the disclosure of a profit or loss and total assets at the 
segment level for all firms. Instead, other items of disclosure depend upon the particular 
circumstances of each firm.  Specifically, other line items must be disclosed only if they are 




(IASB, 2006)1.  Such a unique setting should add to our understanding of the impact of changes 
in accounting regulations and the importance of enforcement in determining the outcomes of 
financial reporting requirements. 
We hypothesize that if IFRS 8 is of higher quality or an improvement on IAS14R, the 
impact of more disaggregated geographical information should outweigh the impact of 
mandating fewer items of disclosure for all firms, and these simultaneous changes should be 
associated with smaller analysts' earnings forecast errors. However, the persistence of 
substantial differences in accounting regulation enforcement at the country level should mean 
that the impact of the standard is not uniform across countries. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
the impact of IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors will vary across countries. We use an 
accounting enforcement proxy developed by Christensen, Hail & Leuz (2013) to provide 
evidence on the role of enforcement. In addition to being an updated proxy of enforcement, it is 
likely to outperform general legal enforcement proxies (Preiato, Brown, & Tarca, 2015).  
Our findings suggest that more country-specific disclosures and fewer items per 
segment under IFRS 8 are associated with more accurate earnings forecasts. While more 
country-specific information under IFRS 8 may result in more efficient use of country-specific 
factors such as inflation and interest rates, GNP, and foreign currency exchange rates, the 
adoption of a principles-based IFRS 8 may have also reduced the disclosure of non-relevant 
items, therefore mitigating the harm associated with noisy disclosures in the pre-IFRS 8 period. 
In addition, the results demonstrate the pivotal role that institutional settings, in particular the 
strength of country level enforcement systems, play in determining the quality of financial 
reporting outcomes and the consequent benefits associated with the adoption of accounting 
regulations. Overall, these results support the IASB view that firms will disseminate more 
relevant information following the adoption of the management approach.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two provides an overview 
of IFRS 8, section three discusses the related literature, section four presents the hypotheses, 
                                                          
1 These items are: assets, liabilities, external revenues, internal revenues, interest revenue, interest expense (or net interest), 
depreciation and amortization, other material items of income and expense, interest in profit or loss of associates and joint ventures 
accounted for using the equity method, income tax expense or income, material noncash items other than depreciation and 





section five explains the research design, section six presents the results, and section seven 
concludes the paper.  
2. Background 
The IASB issued the controversial standard IFRS 8 “Operating Segments” to supersede 
IAS14R which adopted the management approach, similar to the requirements of SFAS 131. 
The core principle of this approach is to report segment information through the eyes of 
management, which, IASB argues, enhances the relevance of the information (IASB, 2006). 
The standard introduces important changes to the rules for the segment identification, 
measurement and disclosure of segment information. It requires the identification of reportable 
segments based on internal reports about components of the entity that are regularly reviewed 
by the CODM. The IASB has also refused to mandate specific line items disclosures or a 
specific measure of segment performance because the core principle of the standard is to report 
from a management perspective. Thus, IFRS 8 is considered a more principles-based standard 
than IAS14R because it emphasizes management judgment over detailed guidance (IASB, 
2013). 
For the first time, IFRS 8 introduces entity-wide disclosures that are required even 
when an entity has only one reportable segment. These comprise three components, namely, (i) 
narrative information about each product and service or groups of products and services; (ii) 
revenues and assets by country of domicile and for each individual country with significant 
revenues and/or assets; and (iii) revenues from transactions with major customer(s) if a single 
external customer accounts for 10% or more of an entity's total revenue2. However, entity-wide 
disclosures tend to be poorly understood and inconsistently applied across firms (Crawford et 
al., 2012; IASB, 2013). 
 IFRS 8 has generated much debate among users, regulators and preparers, particularly in 
the EU. The EU Parliament (EP) opposed its endorsement and asked for further investigation 
and analysis of its potential impact. However, while the EP endorsed the standard, heated 
debate continues on the effectiveness of this approach. For instance, the identity of the CODM 
                                                          
2 This need not be disclosed if the information in unavailable or the cost is excessive in which case this 




and the aggregation criteria are two issues that could cause practical problems for preparers and 
auditors. According to IFRS 8, the first and critical step in preparing a segment information 
report is to identify the CODM. While this is usually the highest level of management (such as 
the managing director, the chief executive officer or the chief operating officer), it is a function 
rather than a specific title and can be performed by either a person or a group (such as the board 
of directors, executive committee, or management committee) (IASB, 2006). Identifying the 
CODM can therefore be problematic because it depends on the entity's management structure 
and processes. Thus, almost half of the post-implementation review (PIR) responses from 
preparers and auditors confirmed that the concept is difficult to understand and apply (IASB, 
2013).  In contrast, investors tended to be concerned that too much operating segment 
aggregation could take place, thus limiting the usefulness of the information disclosed (IASB, 
2013). 
 Further concerns raised include the use of non-IFRS measures, the potential loss of 
geographical information, and the abuse of management discretion. Unlike the preceding 
standard that required segment information to be produced using the same methods as used in 
the consolidated statements, the management approach has not identified or recommended a 
single measure for any financial item. While this might enable investors to better understand 
managements’ decision making, this diversity in measurement may impede their ability to 
compare similar segments across firms or even within a firm. Another tension around IFRS 8 is 
the expected decrease in geographical disclosures because secondary segments are no longer 
required. Given this lack of specific disclosure rules, it is not surprising to find that users were 
generally concerned that IFRS 8 may encourage management to act in their own self-interest 
and manipulate segment reporting and that the objectivity of the reported information may be 
more questionable under the management approach (Berger & Hann, 2003; Crawford et al., 
2012; ESMA, 2011; IASB, 2013). 
 The quality of segment information has been linked to the predictability of earnings 
(Herrmann & Thomas, 1997; Kou & Hussain, 2007), and the majority of analysts’ believe that 
segment performance data are the most useful information for investment decision making 




improvement in segment disclosure is among the most cited reasons why analysts upgrade 
annual ratings of firm disclosures, and Abraham, Marston & Darby’s (2012) surveys revealed 
that segment information is among the most relevant and useful form of information for UK 
analysts.  
 We argue, therefore, that the benefits of IFRS 8 are a function of how the anticipated 
changes in segment information post-IFRS 8 adoption impact the quality of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. However, the variation in financial reporting environments and institutional settings 
across EU countries can affect this; therefore, we examine how country level enforcement 
shapes the anticipated benefits of the principles-based IFRS 8. The literature has established 
that the quality of financial reporting and its consequences are affected by three major factors: 
firm-level reporting incentives, regulation quality, and institutional settings (Ball, 2006; Ball, 
Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Daske et al., 2008; 2013; Kvaal & Nobes, 2010; Nobes, 2006; 2011). 
For instance, several studies find that the substantial capital-market benefits around IFRS are 
conditioned by strong enforcement systems to ensure proper implementation and enforcement 
(Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011; Christensen, Hail & Leuz, 2013; Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010). 
However, Houqe, Easton & van Zijl (2014) documented that the impact of IFRS on information 
quality is higher in low investor protection countries, while Ahmed, Neel, & Wang (2013) 
argued that the enforcement regime has no impact on accounting quality if the regulations are 
looser and allowed for increased managerial discretion.  
3. Literature review  
The impact of IFRS 8 on segment disclosure 
IFRS 8 emphasizes the importance of reporting revenues and assets by country of 
domicile and each individual significant country. Therefore, it is not surprising that prior studies 
have found that the fineness of geographical information increased significantly after the 
introduction of IFRS 8. Crawford et al. (2012) conducted an empirical analysis of FTSE 250 
firms, and Nichols, Street, & Cereola (2012) did likewise for 335 firms in continental Europe. 
Both reported substantial improvement in the disaggregation of geographical information. 




of the geographical segments one year following the introduction of IFRS 8. In a recent study, 
Cereola, Nichols &Street (2017) revealed that the requirement to disclose material countries 
under IFRS 8 resulted in a significant number of companies reporting disaggregated revenues at 
the individual country level. 
In contrast, the number of items disclosed per segment declined following IFRS 8. 
Crawford et al. (2012) and Nichols, Street, & Cereola (2012) report that the number of items 
disclosed per operating segment and as part of entity-wide disclosures substantially decreased 
under the management approach. Similarly, Bugeja, Czernkowski & Moran (2015) used all 
Australian listed firms to document a reduction in the number of line-item disclosures whilst 
Leung & Verriest (2015) documented a loss of information about geographical segment 
income.  
The impact of segment disclosure under IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors 
Although prior research has examined the changes in segment-reporting practices after 
IFRS 8, the usefulness of those changes remains unclear. A common approach employed to test 
the usefulness of segment information is to consider the impact this information has on earnings 
forecasts precision. Previous studies document the usefulness of both overall and specific types 
of disclosures for analysts’ predictions (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; Lang 
& Lundholm, 1996; Yu, 2010). For segment information, the fineness theorem suggests that the 
disclosure of disaggregated data is preferable to the disclosure of only consolidated data 
(Herrmann & Thomas, 1997). This should enable analysts to better evaluate risk and 
profitability and therefore should improve the quality of their predictions.  
Early evidence using mechanical-based forecasts supported the fact that the integration 
of segmental information with industry or country projections outperformed consolidated-based 
forecasts (Balakrishnan, Harris, & Sen, 1990; Kinney, 1971; Mande & Ortman, 2002; Roberts, 
1989). However, mechanical-based forecasts have limitations and the integration of external 
data with internal data is effective only if the segments are properly classified and correspond to 
specific industries or economies. In the case of geographical disclosures, while external 




geographic segment information into regions such as Europe or Asia Pacific, which further 
complicates the integration of external and individual firm data (Roberts, 2010).  
In contrast, the forecasts of financial analysts provide observable and actual measures 
of earnings predictability by sophisticated users of financial statements (Hope, Thomas, & 
Winterbotham, 2006). There is evidence that analysts’ earnings forecasts are greatly superior to 
mechanical models as proxies for investors’ expectations because they incorporate much of the 
information available to market participants (Brown et al., 1987; Kim & Schroeder, 1990; 
Lobo, Kwon, & Ndubizu, 1998) and they have a clear impact on investors’ investment 
decisions (i.e., stock prices and firm values) (Firth & Gift, 1999; Hope, Thomas, & 
Winterbotham, 2006). Therefore, it is likely that rational investors form their expectations using 
analysts’ forecasts (Hussain, 1997). Similar to the mechanical forecasts literature, Baldwin 
(1984) found that the accuracy of these forecasts increased after the introduction of line-of-
business requirements, particularly for multi-segment firms with no prior segment disclosure. 
After the adoption of the management approach in the US, Berger and Hann (2003) 
found that analysts' earnings forecast errors significantly decreased for firms that changed the 
number of segments reported after SFAS 131. In contrast, Botosan and Stanford (2005) 
reported that analysts' earnings forecast errors instead increased for first time reporters. With 
regard to IFRS 8, Leung and Verriest (2015) when examining analysts' earnings forecast errors 
and dispersion as well as bid–ask spreads and implied cost of capital suggested that there are no 
economic benefits associated with the adoption of IFRS 8 in the EU, even for firms with an 
increase in the number of items or segments reported or in geographical fineness. Likewise, 
André, Filip, & Moldovan (2016) concluded that, post IFRS 8, financial analysts do not always 
benefit from increased segment reporting quality and that too many items of information may 
impair their ability to accurately forecast earnings.  
Our study differs from Leung & Verriest (2015) and André, Filip, & Moldovan (2016) 
in several important respects. While they used only two years’ data to explore pre- and post-
IFRS 8 periods, we use a relatively longer period, four years. Moreover, we measure segment 
disclosure in a different way. While André, Filip, & Moldovan (2016) used cross-segment 




disclosures, arguing that country level disclosures could be more easily and effectively used by 
analysts. In addition, our study extends the literature by addressing the effects of country level 
enforcement on the impact of the fineness of geographical information and the quantity of 
segment information on analysts' earnings forecast error.  
Extensive research supports the notion that disclosure quality and its consequences are 
affected by mandatory regulatory intervention, reporting incentives, and institutional factors 
(Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Ball, 2006; Glaum et al., 2013; Houqe, Easton & van Zijl, 
2014). Nevertheless, the debate continues on how these factors interact to determine financial 
reporting quality (Christensen, Hail & Leuz, 2013; Lee, Walker & Christensen, 2008). The 
diversity in the financial reporting environment and institutional settings in the EU provides 
fertile ground from which to contribute to this debate. While some countries in the EU, such as 
the UK, are shareholder-common-law countries, others are stakeholder-model countries and 
prior research has documented the existence of substantial differences in investor protection, 
enforcement, ownership structure and corporate governance across EU countries (La Porta et 
al., 1997; 2002; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003).  
4. Hypothesis development   
Segment information quantity and analysts' earnings forecast errors after IFRS 8  
As discussed above, there is evidence that the adoption of IFRS 8 is associated with a 
reduction in the number of items disclosed per segment (Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 2012; 
Crawford et al., 2012; Bugeja, Czernkowski & Moran, 2015; Leung & Verriest 2015; André, 
Filip, & Moldovan 2016). It is, however, difficult to predict the impact of this on the 
predictability of earnings. On the one hand, firms that disclose fewer items under IFRS8 may be 
motivated by higher proprietary costs so that IFRS8 would led to a loss of relevant information 
and to higher analysts' earnings forecast errors. Alternatively, given that the management 
approach emphasizes relevance and judgment over detailed guidance, the reduction could be of 




negative impact of noisy disclosures. Given these competing arguments, we state the following 
non-directional hypothesis:      
H1. There is a significant association between the quantity of segment information and 
analysts' earnings forecast errors after the introduction of IFRS8.  
 
Segment geographical fineness and analysts' earnings forecast errors after IFRS 8  
Prior research reveals substantial improvements in the level of country-specific 
disclosure following the introduction of IFRS 8 (Bugeja, Czernkowski & Moran, 2015; 
Crawford et al., 2012; Leung & Verriest, 2015; Nichols, Street & Cereola, 2012). Country-
specific information represents the highest possible level of fineness, and its usefulness is clear 
in the demand by financial analysts and others for country-by-country information. It has the 
advantage of being more easily combined with information about the operating environment to 
provide more accurate earnings prediction. Thus, the increase in country-specific information 
following IFRS 8 should better inform users about an organization’s risk profile and the 
assessment of growth prospects. Therefore, the anticipated increases in geographical fineness 
under IFRS 8 should be associated with smaller earnings forecast errors. We thus state our 
second hypothesis:  
H2. Country-specific disclosure under IFRS 8 has an inverse relationship with analyst’s 
earnings forecast errors.  
 
The role of enforcement in shaping the impact of IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors 
The literature has documented the role of institutional settings in determining the 
quality of financial reporting and its consequences. For instance, Francis & Wang (2008) found 
a positive relationship between earnings quality and the strength of the legal system and 
investor protection, and Hope (2003b) found that analysts' earnings forecast errors is negatively 
associated with strong enforcement. Hope (2003b) argued that in a strong enforcement 
environment, managers have to follow the rules; therefore, the complexity of forecasting and 




the EU is associated with smaller forecast errors for countries with strong enforcement. 
Likewise, Li (2010) revealed an association between the mandatory adoption of IFRS and a 
reduction in the cost of capital, but only in countries with strong enforcement mechanisms. 
Christensen, Hail & Leuz (2013) found that the liquidity benefits around IFRS adoption are 
limited to only five EU countries that made substantive changes to their enforcement of 
financial reporting around the same time. This generates the third and fourth hypotheses:  
H3. The quantity of segment disclosure under IFRS 8 has an inverse relationship with analyst’s 
earnings forecast errors in countries that have strong enforcement systems.   
H4. Country-specific disclosure under IFRS 8 has an inverse relationship with analyst’s 
earnings forecast errors in countries that have strong enforcement systems.   
 
5. Research design  
Sample selection  
As outlined, our main objective is to examine the impact of the adoption of IFRS 8 on 
the analysts’ information environment. The study population is the top 500 firms in Europe 
based on the Financial Times list as of 30 March 2011. To achieve consistency, both non-EU 
firms and the financial sectors are excluded, resulting in 285 firms from 18 countries. 
Thereafter, 10 firms were excluded due to unavailability, non-English language, or USA format 
reports, while two firms with late adoption were excluded, leaving 273 firms. Out of these 273, 
18 firms were structured as single-segment firms and were also excluded, generating a final 
sample of 255 firms.  
The adoption year was determined based on a manual investigation of the annual report. 
IFRS 8 was issued in 2006, and its effective date is the period beginning on or after 1 January 
2009. Given that firms used a variety of different year-ends, the years were coded as a 
categorical variable with four values: pre-periods one and two (hereafter Pre2 and Pre1) to 
represent the two years before the adoption of IFRS 8 by a specific firm and post-periods one 
and two (hereafter Post 1 and Post 2) to represent the first and second years of adoption.  
The initial sample distributed across eighteen EU countries, as shown in panel A, table 




distribution in most EU-based studies (Daske et al., 2008; Glaum et al., 2013; Leung & 
Verriest, 2015).  However, the sample represents countries with both weak and strong 
enforcement systems (46% versus 54%, respectively). Observations without financial analysts' 
annual earnings forecast data available from the I/B/E/S summary database have been excluded 
(99 observations) and 78 additional observations were excluded due to the unavailability of 
disclosure measures or control variables. Therefore, as indicated in panel B, table 1, the final 
number of firm-year observations used in the regression is 843.  
Table 1  Sample composition and size. 
Panel A:  Initial sample composition by country 
Country  Firm-Year observations Percent 
Austria 20 2% 
Belgium 20 2% 
Czech Republic 8 1% 
Denmark 44 4% 
Finland 32 3% 
France 192 19% 
Germany 136 13% 
Greece 12 1% 
Hungary 4 0% 
Ireland 12 1% 
Italy 52 5% 
Luxembourg 4 0% 
Netherlands 56 5% 
Poland 12 1% 
Portugal 20 2% 
Spain 52 5% 
Sweden 84 8% 
UK 260 25% 
Total 1020 100% 
 
Panel B: The number of firm-year observations used in the analysis of the relationship between segment 
information and analysts’ earnings forecast errors under IFRS 8. 
 
Sample  Number of firm years % 
Initial sample  1020 100% 
Less: Firms with missing I/B/E/S forecasts  99 10% 
Less: Missing observations  78 8% 







Models and variables  
The following regression models are used to address the impact of IFRS 8 on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts3:  
Analysts’ Forecast Error (LOGAFE) it =   
α + βit CSS + βit FSQ + βit IFRS8 + + βit IFRS 8*FSQ + βit IFRS 8*CSS+ βit LOGMV + βit FOLLOWING + βit PV +   βit SDROE + 
βit LOSS + βit LOB + + βit Earlyadopt+   βit DS+ βit ENFORCE                                                                   Model (1) 
Analysts’ Forecast Error (LOGAFE) it =   
 α + βit CSS + βit FSQ + βit IFRS 8 + βit ENFORCE + βit ENFORCE * CSS + βit ENFORCE * FSQ + βit ENFORCE * IFRS 8 + 
βit IFRS 8*FSQ + βit IFRS 8*CSS + βit ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * FSQ+ βit ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * CSS+ βit LOGMV + βit 
FOLLOWING + βit PV +   βit SDROE + βit LOSS + βit LOB + + βit Earlyadopt+   βit DS                                Model (2)    
The main variables of interest are the interaction terms. While the two-level interactions 
between IFRS 8 and the segment information quantity and country-specific disclosure (IFRS 8 
* FSQ and IFRS 8 * CSS) in model (1) are employed to test the first two hypotheses, the three-
level interactions in model (2) (ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * FSQ and ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * CSS) 
address how the accounting regulation enforcement affects the impact of IFRS 8 on earnings 
predictability. The models also control for firm size (LOGMV), the number of analysts 
following (FOLLOWING), price volatility and earning stability (PV and SDROE), loss 
(LOSS), segment structure (LOB),  early adoption of IFRS8 (Earlyadopt), and domestic sales 
(DS). Table 2 summarises the variables in our models.  
                                                          




Table 2 Summary of Variables definition   
Variables Definitions  Expected Sign  
Analysts’ forecast errors 
(LOGAFE) 
The natural logarithm of AFE, where AFE is the squared error in a median forecast (actual earnings−mean forecast) 2 scaled by stock 
price  
 
Variable of Interest   
Country-specific disclosure (CSS)  % of sales disclosed on a country basis (country-by-country reporting)  
Segment information quantity 
(FSQ)  
The quantity of segment information provided in the footnote of the annual report  
IFRS 8  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if time t is post the adoption of IFRS 8 and 0 otherwise   
IFRS 8 *FSQ (H1) The impact of FSQ after IFRS 8 on analysts’ earnings forecast errors -/+ 
IFRS 8 * CSS (H2) The impact of CSS after IFRS 8 on analysts’ earnings forecast errors Negative 
IFRS 8 * FSQ* ENFORCE (H3)  The impact of  FSQ after IFRS 8  in countries with strong enforcement on analysts’ earnings forecast errors Negative 
IFRS 8 *CSS* ENFORCE (H4) The impact of  CSS after IFRS 8 in countries with strong enforcement on analysts’ earnings forecast errors Negative 
Market Value (LOGMV) 
 
The natural logarithm of market value (share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares issued at the beginning of the year)   
Number of analysts following 
(FOLLOW) 
The number of estimates at the time of the forecast   
Price Volatility (PV) Price volatility is a measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a high and a low price from a mean price for each year  
Standard deviation of return on 
equity (SDROEs) 
The standard deviation of five years ROE (before the forecast year)  
Loss (LOSS)  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" has negative earnings and 0 otherwise   
Line of business (LOB) A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" defined as –LOB and 0 otherwise   
Earlyadopt  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" adopted IFRS 8 early and 0 otherwise   
Domestic sales (DS) The percentage of domestic sales to totals sales   
Enforcement (ENFORCE) A dichotomous variable takes a value of ‘1’ for strong enforcement and ‘0’ otherwise, based on the recent improvement in accounting 





There is agreement in the literature on the proxy of analysts' earnings forecast errors 
(Bhat, Hope, & Kang, 2006; Duru & Reeb, 2002; Hope, 2003b; Jiao et al., 2012; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). Forecast error is used to measure the precision of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Consistent with prior studies (Acker, Horton, & Tonks, 2002; Botosan & Stanford, 
2005; Dehning, Pfeiffer, & Richardson, 2006; Lehavy, Li & Merkley, 2011), the analysts’ 
forecast error (AFE) is calculated as the squared error in the median forecast, whereas the error 
is the difference between the actual earnings per share and the median forecast of one year 
ahead (EPS - median forecast)2, which is scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. 
As argued in prior studies, it is difficult to identify the date on which the annual report 
information reaches the market and influences the analysts' earnings forecast errors (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). In line with Hope (2003b), the average consensus forecast of the annual EPS 
made in months 4-12 is used. As a common procedure and to prompt the normality of 
regression residuals, the natural logs of the measures are used (Barron, Kile, & O'Keefe, 1999; 
Jones, 2007). The analysts’ forecast information is extracted from the I/B/E/S database.  
Segment information measurement 
To measure the quantity of information disclosed, consistent with previous studies 
(Botosan, 1997; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace & Naser, 
1995), we use an index to measure the extent of segment information by counting the number of 
items disseminated in the financial statement notes about segments. IFRS 8 describes key 
principles that should be applied to provide useful information; whether an item is mandatory or 
not often depends upon the specific characteristics of the firm. This means that the distinction 
between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure is somewhat blurred, so this index does 
not distinguish between them.  
Our selected items are derived from an analysis of the standard and a literature review. 
The initial disclosure list was then checked during a pilot study of 20 firms from various sectors 
and countries. This resulted in the removal of some items, such as order backlog, and the 
addition of other items, such as exceptional items. This resulted in a list of 53 comprising two 




includes 15 items relevant to entity-wide disclosure4. The index is unweighted with an item 
score of 1 if it is disclosed and 0 otherwise, with the exception of reconciliation items, which 
were scored as two if details were provided. To minimize applicability problems, following 
others (Cooke, 1989; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Wallace & Naser, 1995), the relative 
disclosure score (RDI) is calculated as the percentage of the actual score awarded to the 
maximum possible score for each firm. For example, if there is no difference between the sum 
of the segment revenue and group revenue, the reconciliation item is not applicable, and the 
firm is not penalized for nondisclosure. Other examples include exceptional items and 
discontinued items, which are considered applicable only if they are disclosed in consolidated 
financial statements.  
We employ country-specific sales to measure geographical fineness. This measure is of 
interest for two reasons. For the first time, IFRS 8 mandates the disclosure of revenues and 
assets by country of domicile and for each individual country with significant revenues and/or 
assets; therefore, it is more likely that this measure will capture the change in geographical 
fineness post-adoption of the new standard. Second, as discussed above, country-specific 
disclosures could be more easily integrated with external data and are therefore more likely to 
affect analysts' earnings forecast errors. We calculate country-specific sales as the proportion of 
total firm sales disclosed by individual countries, including the country of domicile. All 
segment information is manually collected from the annual reports. 
Enforcement Measurement    
Preiato, Brown & Tarca (2015) provided empirical evidence that the explanatory power 
of proxies measuring accounting enforcement outperform general legal enforcement proxies; 
therefore, we use the proxy developed by Christensen, Hail & Leuz (2013) as a measure of the 
quality of accounting regulation enforcement in EU countries. An advantage of this proxy is 
that it is a relatively updated measure of enforcement. ENFORCE takes a value of 1 for 
countries with strong enforcement systems and 0 otherwise, based on improvements in the 
accounting regulations enforcement at the country level between 2001 and 2009 (Christensen, 
Hail & Leuz, 2013). Using this measure, the sample represents both countries with weak 
                                                          




enforcement systems and those with strong enforcement systems (46% versus 54%, 
respectively).  
The study controls for a set of factors that influences analysts' earnings forecast errors. 
It controls for firm size based on the argument that large firms deliver more information about 
future earnings and therefore are more predictable (Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2006; 
Hussain, 1997). Following prior studies (Firth & Gift, 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Yu, 
2010), the natural logarithm of market value at the beginning of the year is used to measure 
firm size (LOGMV). The second control factor is the number of forecasts of future earnings 
(FOLLOWING); previous studies find that the number of analysts following a firm, as a proxy 
for the information environments, is negatively associated with analysts' earnings forecast 
errors (Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2006; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lys & Soo, 1995) 
The analyst following is computed as the number of estimations contained in consensus 
forecasts.  
The third and fourth control variables are used to control for price volatility and 
earnings stability. As confirmed in prior studies, forecast error is expected to be larger for firms 
with more volatile and unstable performance (Hope, 2003b; Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 
2006; Jiao et al., 2012; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Price volatility and standard deviation of 
ROE are employed to control for volatility and forecast difficulties. SDROE is calculated as the 
standard deviation of return on equity over the preceding five years. Price volatility (PV) is the 
measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a high or low price from a mean price at 
the beginning of the year. There are also more difficulties and higher uncertainty associated 
with forecasting loss-making firms (Berger & Hann, 2003; Brown, 2001; Byard, Li, & 
Weintrop, 2006). Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham (2006) argued that analysts’ incentives to 
make accurate forecasts for loss firms are smaller because they are less likely to generate 
trading revenue from these firms. Therefore, the fifth control variable to is LOSS defined as a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 for firms with negative earnings and 0 otherwise. Thus, 
positive significant coefficients are expected for price volatility, earnings stability, and loss 
(PV, SDROE, and LOSS). Furthermore, the models also control for unobservable factors 




line of business (LOB), is incorporated that is equal to 1 if the firm defined its operating 
segment using the business segment and 0 otherwise. Another dichotomous variable, early 
adoption of IFRS 8 (LOB), is incorporated that is equal to 1 if the firm adopted IFRS 8 before 
2008 and 0 otherwise. We also control for the level of domestic sales (DS), measured by the 
percentage of domestic sales to totals sales, as forecast error is expected to be larger for firms 
with foreign sales than those with domestic sales. 
6. Empirical results                                 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 3, panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables employed before and after the 
introduction of IFRS 8.  As indicated, the mean forecast error decreased from .058 to .044 from 
pre to post-IFRS 8. Consistent with prior studies (Crawford et al., 2012; Leung & Verriest, 
2015; Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 2012) the correlation matrix in panel C shows that the 
adoption of IFRS 8 is associated with more county-specific disclosures and less disclosure 
quantity. The coefficients of correlation between IFRS 8 and both the country-specific 
disclosure and segment disclosure quantity (CSS and FSQ) are significant at 1%. The 
disaggregation of geographical information substantially increased following IFRS 8 with 
country-specific disclosure (CSS) increasing from 33.8% of total sales to 46.2% (t-statistic= 
5.27, significant at 1%). Moreover, table 3 shows a variation in the level of country-specific 
disclosure in the sample (range from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero). This indicates 
some non-compliance with IFRS8 since IFRS 8 mandates the disclosure of revenues and assets 
by country of domicile as part of entity-wide disclosures, but it is consistent with the US 
evidence following the introduction of SFAS 131 (Nichols, Street, & Gray, 2000). In contrast, 
the total disclosure score fell from 0.363 pre-IFRS 8 to .345 post-IFRS 8 (t-statistic = 3.23, 
significant at 5%).   
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Table 3  
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for regression variables across Pre-IFRS8 and Post-IFRS8 period 
 
  Pre-IFRS 8 Post-IFRS 8 
  Mean Median MAX MIN SD Mean Median MAX MIN SD 
Analysts’ forecast errors (AFE) 0.058 0.0029 0.89 0.00028 0.142 0.044 0.0029 0.94 0.00025 0.254 
Country-specific disclosure (CSS) 0.338 0.247 1 0 0.34 0.462 0.443 1 0 0.336 
Segment disclosure quantity (FSQ) 0.363 0.36 0.6 0.15 0.087 0.345 0.34 0.6 0.14 0.094 
Market value (MV) 14000 7900 110000 688 16000 13000 5700 110000 425 16000 
Number of estimates FOLLOWING) 25.5 24.2 42.1 13.2 6.76 19.7 19 43 1 7.26 
Price volatility (PV) 25.5 24.2 42.1 13.2 6.76 26.8 25.5 46.3 15 7.05 
Earning stability (SDROE) 9.14 5.62 61 .032 9.53 9.22 6.09 59.7 0.065 9.47 
Loss (LOSS) 0.237 0 1 0 0.426 0.241 0 1 0 0.428 
Line of business (LOB) 0.74 1 1 0 0.439 0.742 1 1 0 0.438 
Domestic sales percentage (DS) 0.361 0.331 1 0.00 0.286 0.314 0.244 1 0.042 0.286 
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Panel B Descriptive Statistics for regression variables by country  
Country N Stats LOGAFE CSS FSQ MV FOLLOWING PV SDROE DS LOSS LOB  ENFORCE 
Austria 19 Mean  0.029 0.432 0.333 3900 12.2 31.5 6.52 0.355 0.105 1 0 




0.0067 0.737 0.374 14000 14.9 27.9 4.47 0.406 0 0.375 0 
Denmark 36 Mean  0.05 0.094 0.311 7200 17.3 28.4 11 0.371 0.472 0.556 0 
France 147 Mean  0.066 0.342 0.346 13000 19.3 26.5 8.16 0.346 0.218 0.755 0 
Greece 8 Mean  0.021 0.724 0.325 6500 19.6 23.2 13.5 0.571 0 1 0 
Italy 30 Mean  0.059 0.499 0.323 19000 23.4 22.3 4.43 0.506 0.067 0.533 0 
Netherlands 53 Mean  0.043 0.402 0.337 11000 19.1 26.7 10.3 0.249 0.321 0.736 0 
Poland 6 Mean  0.113 0.946 0.347 4600 11.2 24.8 7.59 0.49 0.167 1 0 
Portugal 17 Mean  0.0021 0.805 0.404 6800 15.8 22.6 13 0.399 0 0.529 0 
Spain 43 Mean  0.083 0.698 0.427 17000 20.3 23 8.93 0.5 0.14 0.837 0 
Finland 25 Mean  0.043 0.484 0.394 14000 22.4 28.2 9.41 0.248 0.4 1 1 
Germany 97 Mean  0.208 0.299 0.359 15000 23.4 27.2 8.83 0.336 0.371 0.794 1 
Hungary 4 Mean  0.196 0 0.285 8300 14.3 28.5 6.75 0.356 0 1 1 
Ireland 12 Mean  0.0021 0.188 0.31 7100 10.3 29.7 3.11 0.222 0.083 1 1 
Sweden 80 Mean  0.019 0.426 0.353 8700 19.8 27.8 8.23 0.242 0.087 0.787 1 
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Panel C   Pearson correlations between dependent and independent variables. 
  LOGAFE IFRS 8  CSS FSQ LOGMV FOLLOWING PV SDROE DS LOSS LOB ENFORCE 
LOGAFE 1 
          
  
IFRS 8  -0.0084 1 
         
  
CSS -0.0664** 0.1809*** 1 
        
  
FSQ 0.002 -0.1014*** 0.1098*** 1 
       
  
LOGMV -0.0181 -0.0359 0.0567* 0.0236 1 
      
  
FOLLOWING 0.0056 0.0889*** 0.0669** 0.0595* 0.5154*** 1 
     
  
PV 0.1494*** 0.0989*** -0.0876*** 0.0038 -0.2398*** -0.1542*** 1 
    
  
SDROE 0.0195 0.0187 0.0593* -0.0056 -0.0074 -0.0832** 0.0856** 1 
   
  
DS 0.0049 0.0845*** 0.2093*** 0.0517 -0.066*** -0.0923*** -0.1876*** 0.0029 1 
  
  
LOSS 0.1211*** 0.0275 -0.0286 -0.0178 0.0917*** 0.0951*** -0.0168 0.0286 -0.0223 1 
 
  
LOB 0.0876*** 0.011 -0.028 0.1639*** -0.0698*** -0.0262 0.0706*** -0.0061 0.0048 0.0367 1   
ENFORCE 0.0049 -0.0118 -0.0323 0.0622* 0.0769** 0.0649* 0.0335 0.0523 -0.107*** 0.0293 0.0336 1 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for all variables at a country level, and Panel C presents the 
correlation matrix. Any significant differences between Pre-IFRS 8 and Post-IFRS8 are highlighted by italicizing the means of Post-IFRS8 in Table 3, Panel A. 
 
Variables definition  
LOGAFE is defined as the natural logarithm of AFE, where AFE is the squared error in a median forecast (actual earnings−mean forecast) 2 scaled by stock price. IFRS 8 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if time t is post the 
adoption of IFRS 8 and 0 otherwise. CSS is country-specific sales. FSQ is full segment quantity. LOGMV is the natural logarithm of market value. FOLLOWING is the number of estimates. PV is price volatility, calculated as 
the stock's average annual price movement to a high or low price from a mean price at the beginning of the year. SDROE is the standard deviation of five years’ return on equity. DS is defined as the percentage of domestic 
sales to totals sales. LOSS is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" has negative earnings and 0 otherwise. LOB is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" is defined as LOB and 0 otherwise. ENORCE is a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" is from a country with strong enforcement and 0 otherwise.  
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Main Results  
We examined the impact of the changes in the geographical fineness and quantity of 
segment information after IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors. The regression results 
are presented in tables 4 and 5. The adjusted R-squares are 21.5% and 22.6%, suggesting that 
these models explain a reasonable amount of the variation in analysts' earnings forecast errors 
and that they are also consistent with the results of prior studies of analysts’ forecasts for 
European firms (Yu, 2010; Vanstraelen, Zarzeski & Robb, 2003). 
The impact of the changes in segment information following IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings 
forecast errors 
The results presented in table 45 show that the quantity and quality of segment 
information affect the precision of analysts’ forecasts, and this impact is more obvious post-
IFRS 8. Regarding H1, we expect a significant association between the quantity of segment 
information and analysts' earnings forecast errors after the introduction of IFRS 8, but without a 
predicted sign. Consistent with H1, the results suggest that there is a significant association 
between the quantity of segment information after IFRS 8 and analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors. Moreover, the findings indicate that the coefficient of the interaction between IFRS 8 
and segment information quantity (FSQ) is negative and significant at 5%, suggesting smaller 








                                                          
5 The findings remain the same when only firms with complete data for each time period are included. 
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Table 4  
Regression Analysis of the relationship between segment information and analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors under IFRS 8. 
 
Variables a Exp. Mode(1)  
CSS   -0.139 
FSQ   0.46** 
IFRS 8    -0.163 
IFRS 8 * FSQ  H1 (-/+) -0.496*** 
IFRS 8 * CSS  H2 (-) -0.363** 
Control variables      
LOGMV   -0.037 
FOLLOWING   0.033 
PV   0.169* 
SDROE   0.104 
LOSS   2.08*** 
LOB   0.76*** 
Earlyadopt.   -0.13 
DS   -0.292 
ENFORCE    -0.629*** 
Number of observations    843 
adj. R-sq   0. 215 
Time Effect    Yes 
Industry Effect   Yes 
Firm Clustered SE   Yes 
 
Note: Table 4 presents the findings of the regression analysis examining the impact of the changes in segment 
information after IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors (H1 and H2).  
The parameter estimates are based on the following model: 
LOGAFE= α + βit CSS + βit FSQ + βit IFRS8 + + βit IFRS 8*FSQ + βit IFRS 8*CSS+ βit LOGMV + βit FOLLOWING + βit PV +   βit SDROE + βit 
LOSS + βit LOB + + βit Earlyadopt +   βit DS+ βit ENFORCE                                                                    
                                                                                             
 
* Statistical significance at the 10% level (two-tailed). 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed). 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
a Variable definition: 
LOGAFE is defined as the natural logarithm of AFE, where AFE is the squared error in a median forecast (actual earnings−mean 
forecast) 2 scaled by stock price. CSS is country-specific sales. FSQ is full segment quantity. IFRS 8 is a dichotomous variable 
equal to 1 if time t is post the adoption of IFRS 8 and 0 otherwise. LOGMV is the natural logarithm of market value. FOLLOWING 
is the number of estimates. PV is price volatility, calculated as the stock's average annual price movement to a high or low price 
from a mean price at the beginning of the year. SDROE is the standard deviation of five years’ return on equity. LOSS is a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" has negative earnings and 0 otherwise. LOB is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm 
"i" is defined as LOB and 0 otherwise.DS is defined as the percentage of domestic sales to totals sales. Earlyadopt is a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if firm "i" adopted IFRS8 early and 0 otherwise. ENORCE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" is 
from a country with strong enforcement and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are interaction variables.  
 
These results imply that FSQ post-IFRS 8 includes a higher proportion of relevant 
items and therefore reduces the potential harm of noisy disclosures. Financial statement users 
are constrained in the amount of information they can process; thus, the omission of excess 
disclosure could lead to clearer communication and greater focus on meaningful and relevant 
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disclosures (Bloomfield, 2012; Paredes 2003; ICAS 2011). For instance, Miller (2010) found 
that disclosure could lead to suboptimal decision-making due to the inability to absorb the 
volume and complexity of the disclosure. Similarly, the 2014 KPMG survey indicated that the 
volume of mandated disclosures is the main reason for disclosure overload, and footnotes are 
the most significant source of this.  
            Regarding H2, we expect that more country-specific disclosure under IFRS 8 will be 
associated with smaller analyst’s earnings forecast errors. Consistent with H2, the findings 
indicate that the coefficient of the interactions between IFRS 8 and country-specific disclosure 
(CSS) is significant and negative (significant at 5%). These findings suggest that the fineness of 
geographical information is negatively associated with forecast errors post-IFRS 8. The greater 
disaggregation of geographical entity-wide information post-IFRS 8 helps analysts better 
understand and assess the risks and returns, after which forecasts can be made using more 
specific forecast factors, resulting in greater forecast precision (Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b).  
This facilitates the incorporation of country-level external forecast factors such as GDP and 
inflation growth with firm-level disclosures. This finding supports the proposition that that 
disaggregated information is important to financial statement users and to financial analysts in 
particular (Abraham, Marston, & Darby 2012, PwC 2007).  
      In total, these findings suggest that the changes in segment information after IFRS 8 (i.e., 
increase in CSS and decrease in FSQ) have improved the predictability of earnings6. Thus, our 
results support the IASB view that more relevant information is disseminated following the 
adoption of the management approach. Using these findings, it could be established that the 
standard-setters’ policy choices of emphasizing relevance and judgment over detailed guidance 
have improved the overall disclosure environment of multinational firms, at least in terms of the 
predictive ability of earnings. This evidence contrasts with Leung & Verriest (2015) and André, 
                                                          
6 The findings after the exclusion of countries with very high/low CSS score (Portugal, Poland and Hungry) are consistent with the 
reported results.  
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Filip, & Moldovan (2016) who document that the adoption of IFRS8 has no impact on analysts' 
earnings forecast errors7. 
       For control variables, as expected, the coefficients of price volatility (PV), loss (LOSS), 
and line of business (LOB) are positive and significant. Firm size, standard deviation of return 
on equity (SDROE) are the number of estimates (FOLLOWING) are instead all insignificant.  
The role of Accounting Regulation Enforcement 
As discussed in section four, we expect enforcement to affect the relationship between 
segment disclosure and analysts' earnings forecast errors after IFRS 8. Table 5 presents the 
results for the role of the enforcement. The interaction between enforcement, IFRS 8 and 
segment information quantity (IFRS 8 * FSQ* ENFORCE) is used to test H3. Similarly, the 
interaction between enforcement, IFRS 8 and country-specific disclosure (IFRS 8 * CSS* 
ENFORCE) is used to test H4. We expect the impact of the changes in segment information 

















                                                          
7 Our study uses a longer period and a different measure of segment disclosure quality, as discussed in the literature section.   
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Table 5  
Regression analysis of the role of accounting regulation enforcement in shaping the impact of IFRS 8 on 
analysts' earnings forecast errors 
 
Variables a Exp. Sign  Model 2 
CSS   -0.153 
FSQ   0.44* 
IFRS8   -0.135 
ENFORCE    -0.563** 
ENFORCE * CSS   0.111 
ENFORCE * FSQ   -0.198 
ENFORCE * IFRS 8    -0.103 
IFRS 8 * FSQ H1 (-/+) -0.46* 
IFRS 8 * CSS H2 (-) -0.36* 
IFRS 8 * FSQ* ENFORCE H3 (-) -0.016 
IFRS 8 * CSS* ENFORCE H4 (-) -0.766** 
LOGMV   -0.302** 
FOLLOWING   0.19 
PV   0.057* 
SDROE   0.17 
LOSS   2.04*** 
LOB   0.978*** 
Earlyadopt   0.207 
DS   -0.223 










Firm Clustered SE   Yes 
 
 
Note: Table 5 presents an analysis of the role of Accounting Regulation Enforcement in shaping the impact of IFRS 8 
on analysts' earnings forecast errors. 
 
Analyst Forecast Error (LOGAFE) it =   
 
α + βit CSS + βit FSQ + βit IFRS 8 + βit LOGMV + βit LOSS + βit FOLLOWING + βit SDROE + βit PV + βit LOB + βit  DS+ βit Earlyadopt+  βit 
ENFORCE + βit IFRS 8*FSQ + βit IFRS 8*CSS + βit IFRS 8 * FSQ+ βit IFRS 8 * CSS+ βit ENFORCE * FSQ+ βit ENFORCE * CSS+ βit ENFORCE 
* IFRS 8 + βit ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * FSQ+ βit ENFORCE * IFRS 8 * CSS.                                                                                                                                  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level (two-tailed). 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed). 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
a Variables definition   
LOGAFE is defined as the natural logarithm of AFE, where AFE is the squared error in a median forecast (actual earnings−mean 
forecast) 2 scaled by stock price. CSS is country-specific sales. IFRS 8 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if time t is post the 
adoption of IFRS 8 and 0 otherwise. FSQ is full segment quantity. LOGMV is the natural logarithm of market value. FOLLOWING 
is the number of estimates. PV is price volatility, calculated as the stock's average annual price movement to a high or low price 
from a mean price at the beginning of the year. SDROE is the standard deviation of five years’ return on equity. DS is defined as 
the percentage of domestic sales to totals sales. Earlyadopt is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" adopted IFRS8 early and 
0 otherwise. LOSS is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" has negative earnings and 0 otherwise. LOB is a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if firm "i" is defined as LOB and 0 otherwise. ENFORCE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm "i" is from 
a country with strong enforcement and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are interaction variables. IFRS 8 * FSQ* ENFORCE: 
represents the impact of FSQ after IFRS 8 in countries with strong enforcement on analysts' earnings forecast errors (Hypothesis 3). 
IFRS 8 * CSS* ENFORCE represents the impact of CSS after IFRS8 in countries with strong enforcement on analysts' earnings 
forecast errors (Hypothesis 4).  
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The results demonstrate the importance of an adequate accounting regulation enforcement 
system: the coefficient of enforcement (ENFORCE), which is reported table 5, is negative and 
significant at 5%, suggesting smaller earnings forecast error in countries with strong 
enforcement. Regarding H3, the coefficient of the interaction between enforcement, IFRS 8 and 
segment disclosure quantity (IFRS 8*FSQ* ENFORCE) is negative, as expected, but not 
significant. While the coefficient of interaction between IFRS 8 and country-specific disclosure 
(IFRS 8 * CSS* ENFORCE) is negative and significant at 5%. This is consistent with 
hypothesis 4 in that more country-specific disclosure is associated with smaller forecast error in 
countries with strong enforcement systems. These findings are consistent with prior research in 
that the benefits associated with disclosure quality and regulation changes are higher in strong-
enforcement countries (Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011; Christensen, Hail & Leuz, 2013; Daske et al., 
2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Li, 2010). Dhaliwal et al. (2012) found that the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility disclosure and analysts' earnings forecast errors is 
stronger in countries that have strong enforcement systems. Likewise, Byard, Li, & Yu (2011) 
find that the adoption of IFRS in the EU is associated with smaller forecast errors for countries 
with strong enforcement. 
7. Conclusions   
            This paper documents an improvement in analysts' earnings forecast errors after the 
adoption of IFRS 8 using a sample of the largest firms in the EU. The findings support the 
fineness theorem in that more disaggregated information is associated with an improvement in 
earnings forecast accuracy. We find that the adoption of the management approach is associated 
with more country-specific disclosures but fewer items of disclosure, which resulted in smaller 
forecast errors. These findings suggest that by moving towards a more principle based approach 
whilst also requiring some disclosures by country, IFRS 8 has provided more relevant 
information than its predecessors and, therefore, the standard-setters’ policy choices has 
improved the overall disclosure environment of multinational firms, at least in terms of the 
predictive ability of analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
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             Furthermore, the results document the importance of country-level enforcement in 
shaping the impact of IFRS 8 on analysts' earnings forecast errors. The findings suggest that 
enforcement is a complement to disclosure quality. We find that employing a measure of 
enforcement strengthens the relationship between disclosures and predictability of earnings 
under IFRS 8. This evidence expands our understanding of the impact of IFRS 8 on the quality 
of financial reporting outcomes. It provides feedback of pivotal interest to the European 
Commission, which has raised several concerns about the quality of segmental information 
under IFRS 8. It also provides timely evidence about the usefulness of country-by-country 
reporting. In July 2013, the EP approved EU Transparency and Accounting Directives, which 
follows the Dodd Frank Act Section in the US. On a country-by-country basis, these pieces of 
legislation provide mandates for firms that are active in extractive industries and banking 
sectors.  
It is important to acknowledge certain limitations of our study. First, the sample 
distribution may be influencing the results given that the majority of top firms in the EU are 
based in only three countries, the UK, France and Germany. However, this applies to all EU-
based studies (Armstrong et al., 2010; Daske et al., 2013). We examined the impact of IFRS 8 
on two important dimensions of disclosure, geographical fineness and number of items 
disclosed; however, the new standard may have an impact on other dimensions of disclosure. 
For example, Troberg, Kinnunen & Seppänen (2010) asserted that the diversity in returns and 
risks across the reported segments is a key characteristic of segment reporting. Our study uses a 
self-constructed index to measure the volume of information. Despite the use of several 
procedures chosen to reduce subjectivity, in particular the use of an unweighted index and the 
avoidance of any classification of disclosures into mandatory and voluntary items, we cannot 
assert that the study is free of all subjectivity.  
We only investigated the implications of segmental disclosures and IFRS 8 for earnings 
forecasts. Future research is needed to examine other consequences of segmental disclosures 
such as information asymmetry and firm values. Whilst information asymmetry might be 
expected to decrease following the adoption of IFRS 8 because the gaps between outsiders and 
insiders or managers and between privately informed and normal investors are narrowed 
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because segmental information is reported through the eyes of management, evidence is lacking 
on this. In the same vein, if firms under IFRS 8 provide more disaggregated information about 
the allocation of resources between segments, it is likely that these firms’ values will change.  
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